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Abstract 
The nexus between climate change and migration has received increasing attention in 
recent years. Using a governmentality framework, this article analyses how global 
governance has conceptualised and addressed the relationship between these two 
phenomena. It will show that the planetary-level problem of climate-induced migration 
has been disaggregated into more manageable subsets slowly consolidating into a 
protection framework on the one hand and a resilience-focused development framework 
on the other. It argues that the selection of relevant causal processes and problem 
definitions is not an objective, neutral and technical question. While disaggregation has 
undoubtedly contributed to improved global governance in the issue area, it has also 
obscured the causal processes and responsibilities that can only be identified at the 
planetary level. 
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Introduction 
In 2015 European politics was dominated by growing social and political tensions 
emerging around an increasing, and seemingly unmanageable, flow of migrants towards 
the continent. According to data from the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), over a million migrants arrived in Europe over the course of the year. More than 
two thirds of them fled conflict-ridden Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, and 3,771 among 
them lost their lives while trying to reach Europe by sea. In the meantime, arguably the 
most outstanding question of the year at the global level was whether developed and 
developing countries would finally reach an agreement at the 21st United Nations 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties 
(COP21) negotiations in Paris which would make it possible to prevent climate change 
from reaching catastrophic levels. 
In the context of these parallel challenges, policy entrepreneurs, scientists and 
journalists did not miss the opportunity to point out links between the two developments. 
In the warm-up to COP21, Prince Charles of the UK noted in an interview that civil war 
in Syria – which had by that time produced over four million internationally displaced 
people – can be linked to a six-year drought period between 2006 and 2011 (Press 
Association, 2015). The scientists, whose work he was making reference to, had 
established a link between falling rates of precipitation and anthropogenic climate change, 
and argued that the ensuing internal migration pressure and scarcity of food contributed 
to rising social tensions, thus facilitating the onset of conflict (Kelley et al., 2015).  
This research joined other, earlier works, including an influential collection of 
essays in which researchers claimed that the impact of climate change on global food 
supplies and, consequently, on rising price levels of basic food items, contributed to the 
Arab Spring of 2013 (Werrell & Femia, 2013). The instability and conflict that often grew 
out of this upheaval was, in turn, a major factor behind increasing international migration 
as well. Such findings received detailed coverage in mainstream media, with one article 
claiming that climate-induced mass migration constitutes “a new paradigm” or “new 
normal” to which all societies need to adjust (O’Hagan, 2015; Baker, 2015; Bawden, 
2015; Sinai, 2015). 
A similar discourse dominated the world of international organizations. António 
Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, centred his opening 
remarks at the Dialogue on Protection Challenges in December 2015 on the necessity of 
understanding the complex interaction between climate change, conflict and mass 
displacement (Guterres, 2015). At around the same time, the climate change – migration 
nexus was on the agenda of the COP21 negotiations. During the event the coordinator of 
the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility emphasised that climate-
related displacement is a present reality, and as such a “threat multiplier” that contributed 
to more than 22.5 million people displaced per year on average since 2008 (UNDP, 2015). 
The COP21 Paris agreement, adopted on December 12, for the first time formally 
included in its Preamble the problem of migration, and requested a task force to be set up 
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within the Loss and Damage component2 of climate change policy to “develop 
recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement 
related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC COP21, 2015: 2,7). 
The sense of simultaneously occurring environmental and migration crises 
focused attention on the interlinkages of these issues. The connection between them has 
in fact been noted at least as early as the mid-1980s. The increasing salience of the 
challenges posed by global warming raised the possibility that climate change might join 
the list of “root causes” of migration, alongside – or perhaps even in a position of primacy 
over – poverty, underdevelopment, and protracted conflict (Castles & Van Hear, 2011). 
The goal of the present article is to analyse how and with what effects global 
governance has addressed the nexus between climate change and migration. Although the 
large majority of climate-induced displacement is expected to take place within state 
boundaries (Laczko & Piguet, 2014), the focus here will be on international migration, 
i.e. cross-boundary displacement, as this issue takes the problem of human mobility 
directly to the international/global level. Moreover, the discussion presented here is 
implicitly dominated by the theme of migration from the global South to the global North.  
International migration is defined here as cross-border mobility involving a 
change in the location of a person’s livelihood, and global governance as a non-
hierarchical, problem-oriented activity coordinated by shared epistemic, normative and 
practical standards in which both state and non-state actors might participate. Agents of 
global governance (or “global governors”) are understood as all those “authorities who 
exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy,” where power might 
include the setting of agendas, the definition and creation of issues, the implementation 
of policies as well as the evaluation of outcomes and of other actors (Avant et al., 2010: 
2). These authorities can be individuals, states, intergovernmental or civil society 
organizations as well as business actors. Of the two major “global governors” in the 
context of this article, for instance, the International Organization for Migration is an 
intergovernmental organization, whereas the Nansen Initiative on disaster-induced cross-
border displacement is led by Norway and Switzerland. 
                                                          
2 Global climate change policies are made up of three components: mitigation, adaptation and „loss and 
damage.” Mitigation refers to measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions in order to minimise 
the extent of climate change. Adaptation aims at reducing vulnerability to the consequences of climate 
change. The actual losses resulting from climate change – those not prevented by mitigation or adaptation 
efforts – are addressed under loss and damage. 
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The structure of the article is as follows. The ensuing section discusses how the 
causal relationship between climate change and migration has been conceptualised and 
concludes by arguing that identified causal links underlying actual policy approaches are 
better understood as intersubjective constructs than as direct representations of an overly 
complex objective reality. Accordingly, the article proposes to investigate the existing 
epistemic and normative frameworks (governmentalities) within which the nexus at issue 
has been picked up, problematised, and made available to rational management within 
global governance. The next section describes how the general landscape of international 
migration governance is organised around a distinction between voluntary and forced 
migration. The third section then turns to mapping the current governance framework of 
the climate change – migration nexus, arguing that it is consolidating around a two-tiered 
system of a rights-focused protection framework and a resilience-focused understanding 
of development. This system accords with the distinction between forced and voluntary 
migration despite the ways in which the link to anthropogenic climate change transgresses 
these boundaries. The final section presents the argument that while there is a clear 
relationship between climate change and migration at the planetary level, in actual 
international/global governance initiatives the issue is disaggregated into lower-level 
systemic frameworks. While this facilitates the effective management of the identified 
problems, disaggregation itself – and not only the discourses of particular frameworks – 
contributes to depoliticizing the nexus of climate change and migration, and to reifying 
the state system and the contemporary economic order.  
 
The problem of causality 
Global climate change is considered today to be the “highest profile emerging issue” in 
the field of migration and refugee policy (Koser, 2013). More alarmist voices even argue 
that – by contributing to state fragility and related security threats – climate change-
induced migration poses a threat that demands resources for international action on a par 
with those for the management of peace and war (Werz & Hoffman, 2015). The link 
between the two phenomena has, however, come under increasing scrutiny in recent 
years, at least in terms of its usefulness for policy-making (Mayer 2015). 
Prominent in the early stages of migration studies in the 19th century, the idea of 
environmental migration faded out of fashion after the Second World War as being too 
deterministic and overly pessimistic about the force of human progress over nature, and 
a negligible factor compared to the economic determinants of migration (Piguet 2013). In 
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the mid-1980s the concept was resuscitated in the context of climate change advocacy, as 
a way of stressing the deleterious impact of unbridled greenhouse gas emissions 
(McAdam, 2011: 158). Consequently, the concept today exhibits an inherent bias, 
referring only to migration resulting from the negative effects of climate change (push 
factors) affecting the global South the most, and thus it is rarely taken to include human 
mobility in search of better environmental circumstances (e.g. suburbanization) in 
general.  
Several causal pathways have been identified linking atmospheric changes to 
population displacement (McAdam, 2011). Climate change is expected to increase the 
frequency and magnitude of weather-related disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, 
leading to abrupt population moves. Other links operate through more slowly unfolding 
processes: the gradual disappearance of the territory of small island states as a result of 
increasing sea levels, or other slow-onset forms of environmental degradation, such as 
water scarcity, that destroy livelihoods and force people to migrate.  Planned relocations 
in anticipation of these processes add a further source of displacement. Finally, 
environmental degradation is also understood to lead to competition over increasingly 
scarce resources, potentially contributing to the onset of violent conflicts and, thus, 
indirectly to migration (Nordås & Gleditsch 2007). This latter pathway has been 
identified as being at work in Syria. 
The 1990s produced a number of apocalyptic predictions on the basis of this as to 
the anticipated scale of displacement. The prospect of large-scale migration due to 
unstoppable natural forces contributed to an increasingly securitised and dehumanised 
image of migration in the 1990s (Hammerstad, 2014: 270). By the early 2000s, however, 
this presentation of the link between climate change and migration came under increasing 
fire from migration research (Black, 2001; Martin, 2010). Some of the criticism was 
directed at alarmist images, revising downwards the predicted magnitude of the problem 
and pointing out that the overwhelming majority of displacement will be short-term and 
will either not involve crossing borders or will remain short-range. 
Furthermore, while the emphasis on a direct link and the idea of “climate 
refugees” may have been an effective tool for norm entrepreneurs (Mayer, 2015), in the 
hands of migration experts the causal links began to seem more and more tenuous. 
Although it is generally accepted that climate change exacerbates patterns of 
displacement (current predictions running between 200 million and 1 billion people 
displaced in the next 40 years), linking actual instances of migration directly to climate 
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change is seen as almost impossible (and even undesirable), because environmental 
factors are always mediated by a wide range of social variables (Laczko & Piguet, 2014; 
Pachauri & Meyer, L.A., 2014: 16; GMG, 2011). Economic disparities, the availability 
of infrastructure or the lack thereof, access to political power and representation, class-
structures, gender relations, economic policies, etc. all deeply influence how particular 
communities and individuals are affected by climate change. Thus, whereas the 
Netherlands might have the resources to defend itself from climate change-related sea 
level rise, the same is not true for a poor developing country such as Bangladesh.  
Similarly, although climate change contributed to the drought in Syria between 2006 and 
2011, the concomitant internal migration and social tensions were just as much the results 
of the government’s agricultural policy being directed at cash crop production (Sinai, 
2015).  
The seemingly apolitical relationship between environmental push factors and 
migration has thus become the target of growing criticism, and the emphasis shifted 
towards complex, multi-causal frameworks in which disaggregating individual causal 
factors is thought to be nearly impossible (Zetter & Morissey, 2014: 343). Instead of 
trying to identify something like “climate migration” and developing a related set of 
policies and global institutions, researchers suggested looking at how climate change 
affects existing drivers of migration (Collyer, 2014: 117) or how migration is transformed 
in the context of climate change and environmental degradation (Faist & Schade, 2013:4). 
Others further argued that causal reasoning is in fact pointless in such complex systems, 
and problems are much better addressed by focusing on how to effectively allocate 
resources, or on identifying and responding to human rights violations irrespective of 
their causal background (Betts, 2010a: 378; Nicholson, 2014). The multi-causality and 
multi-dimensionality of climate-induced migration has become a taken-for-granted 
starting point for global governance (IOM, 2014). 
It is, however, precisely such difficulties with pinning down a straightforward 
causal link between climate change and international migration that bring the social 
construction of policy problems into the foreground. Challenges for global governance 
are never simply objectively given: the objects of government must always first be 
identified, and problems then need to be defined and goals selected. Identifying causal 
links – deciding on which causal relations are more relevant than others and on which 
shall thus occupy the centre of attention (Betts, 2011: 23) – is part of the contested 
construction of policies, since the rational government of problems relies on 
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understanding their nature and the opportunities it presents for intervention and 
management. This process involves selectivity and simplification, and brings to bear on 
the outcome a range of political, ideational and normative influences. Furthermore, the 
intersubjective process of causality-attribution simultaneously – and necessarily – 
identifies relations of power and, thus, of responsibility (Guzzini, 2009; Lukes, 2005; 
Connolly, 1993: 85–137). 
Accordingly, the rest of the paper will investigate how the relationship between 
climate change and migration has been taken up in various ways within global 
governance. What governmental rationality (or governmentality) can be identified in 
these frameworks (Pécoud 2013; Kalm 2012; Geiger & Pécoud 2012a)? I.e.: How is 
migration understood? How are causal relations, problems and goals defined and 
solutions identified? What shared theoretical principles, forms of knowledge and norms 
inform them, providing a taken-for-granted basis and justification for exercising 
government? What categorization and conceptual distinctions are used to represent the 
issue for the purpose of devising policies? 
 
The governance of international migration 
International migration is part of a broader field of global mobility that excludes those 
crossing borders only for short-term travel [tourists, business travellers, etc.] (Samers, 
2009; Koslowski, 2011). Its two major categories, refugees and the rest of international 
(economic) migrants are co-constituted with the system of sovereign, territorial states that 
continue to dominate world politics. The concept of refugee implicitly contains the idea 
that every person should be under the protection of the state to which he or she belongs. 
If that state is unable or unwilling to provide that protection, an anomaly appears that we 
call a refugee (Betts, 2014). More broadly, control over population mobility is at the core 
of modern state sovereignty, and hence cross-border flows of people are, from such a 
systemic perspective, a problem or a threat (Geiger, 2013: 16–18). 
Taking the above considerations into account, it is not surprising that states remain 
the primary actors in global migration governance (Koser, 2010). No formal and coherent 
multilateral institutional framework is currently in place to regulate international 
migration; instead, mostly non-binding bilateral and regional agreements, customary and 
soft law, and indirect governance through other areas of global governance (health, 
development, travel, human rights, security, etc.) characterise the field (Koser, 2013; 
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Koslowski, 2011; Betts, 2010b).3 The well-developed institutional framework and 
relatively strong state obligations of the refugee protection regime provide the strongest 
exception to this general picture. It is a fairly limited one however, outside of which 
migration governance remains fragmented and informal.  
The distinction between refugees or forced migrants and voluntary migrants is a 
fundamental element of the prevailing governmentality of international migration 
governance, which is also manifest in the existing institutional framework. In terms of 
their basic normative structure, the two systems are quite distinct: the regulation of 
voluntary migration is understood to fall almost completely – with the exception of 
fundamental human rights provisions – under the discretion of sovereign states, who 
make their decisions on the basis of economic calculations or other considerations. In 
contrast, forced migration is a realm of morality: it is identified in terms of rights 
violations to which individual states and the international community have a 
responsibility to react (Betts & Loescher, 2011). The central norm of the refugee regime 
is non-refoulement: once stepping onto the territory of a receiving state, asylum-seekers 
should not be returned to their country of origin (or to any other territory where they 
would suffer persecution as defined above) before determining their refugee status. 
Beyond providing asylum, states are also expected, although not required, to share the 
burden of refugee protection in major receiving states (Betts, 2014: 66).  
The category of forced migration accommodates a broad range of phenomena, 
including state persecution, conflict-induced displacement, environmental displacement 
or displacement resulting from the implementation of large-scale development projects 
(Betts, 2009). Much of this migration remains within borders, but civil wars and 
persecution by the state in particular require action on the international level. In contrast 
with such a broad understanding of forced migration, however, the actual legal category 
of refugee is a fairly limited one. Based on the 1951 Geneva Convention, which was 
universalised in 1967, a refugee is defined as a person persecuted by his or her own state 
for reasons of race, religion, ethnicity, political opinion or being member of a social group 
who therefore seeks protection outside the borders of the state concerned. Political human 
agency is thus a constitutive factor in the idea of the refugee. Such a restrictive definition 
is at odds with the broad range of protracted, life-threatening conditions that force people 
to leave their countries. State practice and regional arrangements consequently often 
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handle refugee status in a more expansive manner to include at least some of those who 
have been characterised as “survival migrants” (Betts, 2010a), especially people fleeing 
conflict zones (Popp, 2014). 
During the Cold War, the refugee regime was dominated by political 
considerations in the context of the ideological conflict between the “free world” and the 
Communist bloc, and was generally reactive in nature. The refugee flows triggered by the 
dissolution of states in the 1990s then prompted a more proactive attitude with an 
emphasis on prevention, especially by means of reforming and strengthening institutional 
capacities in fragile states of the global South, thus linking the refugee regime more 
closely with security and development (Gottwald, 2014). 
In contrast with the humanitarian concerns of the refugee regime, the governance 
of voluntary migration was from the beginning focused on calculating economic benefits 
and on the necessity of controlling a potentially threatening flow of migrants (Geiger & 
Pécoud, 2012a; Kalm, 2012). At the most basic level, voluntary migration is generally 
conceptualised as an “economic response to the gap in income” between more and less 
developed countries (Collier, 2013: 38). From the perspective of the receiving states, 
immigration can offer economic advantages by providing an additional and cheap source 
of labour force. Simultaneously, however, inward migration is also considered to have 
potentially significant costs in terms of the social security system, social and cultural 
cohesion, security and political stability (Watson, 2009: 6–7). 
Consequently, international migration was traditionally governed on a strict 
national, intergovernmental and mostly bilateral basis. It was only in the 2000s that the 
management of populations rose to the global agenda with the emergence of a new 
approach called “migration management” (Geiger & Pécoud, 2012b). At the centre of this 
approach stands the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which is not part of 
the UN system and generally serves as a provider of services for states. More broadly, 
different agencies related to migration management (including the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], the UN Development Program [UNDP] and 
others) are united under the umbrella of the Global Migration Group (GMG), a forum for 
discussion, coordination and the exchange of best practices. 
In contradistinction with the earlier approaches to migration, which focused on 
legal instruments and on stopping what was perceived as an ongoing and threatening crisis 
of migration flows, migration management conceives migration as a normal state of 
affairs: an intrinsically human activity which, if steered adequately, can be a positive 
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process for all involved. Migration management operates in a form of “regulated 
openness,” a liberalised but managed movement of populations driven by the exigencies 
of the market (Geiger & Pécoud, 2012a: 3; Kalm, 2012). Instead of curbing migration, 
this new approach seeks to put it to work and to optimise it on the basis of cost-benefit 
calculations. It promises a predictable and orderly circulation of people between the 
global South and the global North, which at the same time is supposed to contribute to 
global development in both regions (Pécoud, 2013).  
The circular migration (fluid, mostly temporary labour migration between 
countries) that is at the centre of migration management is thought to provide resources 
for the economies of the North, to ease social tensions associated with permanent 
migration, to address concerns about brain drain from the global South, and also to help 
the improvement of economic conditions in the source countries through generating 
considerable remittance flows (Kalm, 2012). The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, 
announced in September 2015, now also incorporate “the positive contribution of 
migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development.” The document names the 
facilitation of “orderly, regular and responsible migration” and of remittance flows as 
central policies to reduce global inequality (UNGA, 2015: 8, 21).  
Migration is hence presented no longer as a problem but as a solution to a range 
of challenges (ageing populations in the global North, development in the global South). 
In fact, by reducing international inequality, over time managed migration is expected to 
lead to reduced South-to-North migration. Through its links with development it is also 
supposed to contribute to the preventative elements of refugee protection by propping up 
the resources of weak states and by increasing the resilience of communities against 
certain causes of forced migration (e.g. natural disasters, famines and other complex 
emergencies). 
This is not the only way in which the two elements of the governance of 
international migration have converged over the years (Koser, 2013). Because of practical 
difficulties in distinguishing between refugee and other migration flows as well as 
between economic and survival motives (well demonstrated in the current European 
crisis), these two dimensions have long been difficult to separate in practice. In the 1990s 
a discourse on security provided the encompassing framework (Hammerstad, 2011: 242), 
largely replaced by the framework of development by today. 
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Governing the climate change – migration nexus 
The entry of climate change among the factors driving migration raised new questions 
about the framework described above. At a minimum it added another item – climate 
change governance, with the UNFCCC at its centre – to the long list of regimes involved 
in migration governance. More fundamentally, however, this new association cast further 
doubt over the distinction between economically-driven voluntary migration and rights-
focused refugee protection challenges (Koser, 2013: 668). Although climate change faces 
those affected by it as an environmental factor, its anthropogenic sources are recognised 
by the UNFCCC. It is further admitted in the basic norm of “common but differentiated 
responsibility” that industrialised countries bear a larger responsibility – and should bear 
a larger share of the burdens of managing the problem – because climate change is the 
outcome of the accumulative impact of the same historical development that made them 
prosperous. Thus a systemic force is identified on a planetary level which is expected to 
have a negative effect on livelihoods all over the world, but more so precisely in societies 
of the underdeveloped global South that contributed the least to bringing about the 
problem.  
This at least partly throws into question the distinction between voluntary and 
forced migration as well as between pull and push factors, both constitutive of current 
migration governance (Kalm, 2012). Even in the domain of economic development it is 
arguably the case that man-made global institutional structures contribute significantly to 
maintaining global inequalities (Pogge, 2010), but there the relationship is not officially 
recognised and is largely obscured by a naturalization of market forces. In the case of 
climate change, in contrast, differentiated human causal responsibility is clearly accepted, 
opening a path towards establishing relations of moral and legal responsibility. Another 
consequence of this is that climate change not only adds stronger moral and “push” 
considerations to the idea of voluntary migration, but it also becomes difficult to contain 
within the conceptual boundaries of the refugee regime. Whereas refugees are supposed 
to flee from their state, which not only does not protect them but is a perpetrator of the 
violation of their human rights, in the case of climate-change-induced migration people 
might be conceived as fleeing precisely to the perpetrator states in the global North 
(McAdam, 2011: 165–6). 
Such lines of reasoning informed calls for the recognition of a new category of 
“climate refugees” or “climate migrants” (e.g.: Biermann & Boas, 2010), although 
broader considerations of effective climate change advocacy also played a major role. In 
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the 1990s no framework was available to address this new issue in a straightforward 
manner. Extending the refugee regime to include those displaced by the consequences of 
climate change encountered serious difficulties. On the one hand, as mentioned above, 
the category of the refugee is restricted to those affected by protracted and life-threatening 
(political) push factors that force them to cross borders, and this covers only a limited 
circle of people affected by climate change (Lister 2014). On the other hand, there has 
been no willingness on the part of the most developed states to extend their special 
responsibility as major emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to include an obligation to 
admit climate migrants onto their territories (McAdam, 2014). 
Instead of developing a new framework around the particular categories of 
“climate refugee” or “climate migrant”, global governance responded to the climate 
change – migration nexus in a way that worked around the novelty of the problem: by 
drawing distinctions among forms of migration on the basis of their different immediate 
causes, i.e. the effects of climate change. This way it also reasserted the existing 
categories of governance with complementary policies for covering the major gaps left 
by them. Today the governance of the nexus seems to be consolidating in a dual structure: 
a rights-based protection framework and a managerial development framework. 
This structure is based on disaggregating migration into the following major 
categories: 
  
a) migration resulting from climate-induced conflict; 
b) temporary displacement induced by sudden-onset disasters;  
c) permanent migration due to slow-onset disasters (sea level rise, 
desertification, etc.);  
d) temporary voluntary migration in the context of climate change.  
 
Of these four strands, the first remains managed within the general framework for 
conflict-induced displacement, with its partial extension of the category of the refugee 
and its emphasis on preventative state-building. The second and the third have become 
part of the protection agenda, crystallizing around the Nansen Initiative, and the last was 
effectively incorporated into the system of migration management. 
International action on climate migration was catalysed by the Cancún Adaptation 
Framework adopted at COP16 in 2010, which for the first time recognised climate-
change-induced migration as a part of the adaptation agenda (UNFCCC COP16 2010: 
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para.14(f)). It was the UNHCR that first tried to address the lack of protection in 
international law and governance for people displaced across borders as a result of natural 
disasters, including those related to climate change. Due to state opposition to the 
agency’s role, the issue was later transferred to the Nansen Initiative, which was launched 
in 2012 as a state-led, multi-stakeholder consultative process (McAdam 2014). The aim 
of the initiative is to develop a common conceptual framework and to identify effective 
practical measures that states and other actors can share and voluntarily adopt in this 
policy field.  
In October 2015 the first phase of the Nansen Initiative closed as 109 
governmental delegations endorsed the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border 
Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change – in short: the 
Protection Agenda (The Nansen Initiative, 2015). The specificity of the Nansen initiative 
is its focus on the problem of protection, i.e. on facilitating the creation of a legal and 
practical tool-box that would specify and guarantee the human rights (and 
responsibilities) of people displaced across borders. It encourages states and regional 
actors to develop legal instruments for admitting environmentally displaced people to 
their territories, as well as to extend the principle of non-refoulement to such migrants 
already on their territory. UNHCR (2014) also provides guidelines for temporary 
protection in such circumstances. Although slow-onset disasters rarely lead to cross-
border displacement, in extreme cases (such as whole island-states disappearing under 
rising sea levels) the Nansen Initiative also promotes the option of permanent migration. 
Although rights-based protection is at the centre of the Nansen Initiative, recently its 
agenda has been extended to incorporate broader measures to prevent and manage 
displacement (The Nansen Initiative, 2015: 44–52). These include, among others, two 
areas that make up the development framework of climate migration governance: 
facilitated migration as an adaptation mechanism, and policies to improve the resilience 
of affected communities. By reducing the vulnerability of populations, these measures 
are expected to prevent cross-border displacement. Facilitated migration in this context 
is understood both as a form of adaptation itself and as a mechanism supporting the 
adaptation and resilience agenda. Although the Nansen Protection Agenda calls for 
facilitated temporary migration, the central actors in this field remain the IOM and the 
major development agencies. 
The reconceptualization of climate migration in the development framework, from 
being a problem to offering a potential solution, is the most significant change to have 
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taken place in the governance of the climate-migration nexus in recent years 
(Vlassopoulos 2013). Foresight (2011), a report commissioned by the British government 
on this issue, has been identified as the turning point when the approach of migration 
management – described above – began to incorporate the problem of climate change 
(Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015: 113; Methmann & Oels, 2015: 59–60). As a consequence, 
migration in the context of climate change is no longer approached primarily as a problem 
created by failed mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change, but as a strategy of 
adaptation, including as a mechanism for generating resources for adaptation (Martin, 
2013; Felli, 2013). Migration is now understood as a normal and, if well managed, 
potentially beneficial human activity that can be mobilised in order to address problems 
caused by climate change, thus complementing national adaptation strategies.  
Circular migration is thought to allow communities to diversify their livelihood 
by not depending only on local economic resources. It also reduces population pressure 
on scarce environmental resources. As an extension of the development context, 
remittances by migrants can provide resources for “trapped” – immobile – communities 
to develop the infrastructure, skills and other instruments necessary for adaptation and for 
achieving increased resilience in the face of climate change (Martin, 2013). Moreover, 
circular migration itself is also understood as a form of resilience: the expression of an 
entrepreneurial ethic that allows individuals and communities to better take care of 
themselves in emergency situations in a context of limited global resources (Felli, 2014; 
Gottwald, 2014: 532–5). 
 
Conclusion: Disaggregated planetary governance and its discontents 
This article has argued that the definition of problems, causal relationships and solutions 
offered is a deeply social and political process. Accordingly, it looked into how the 
relationship between climate change and international migration has been conceptualised 
in global governance for the purpose of making it amenable to policy interventions. It is 
suggested that we are witnessing the consolidation of a complex set of instruments that 
address the nexus through disaggregating it into smaller and more manageable categories 
focusing on more direct causal links (e.g. natural disasters and displacement, slow-onset 
resource depletion and displacement, etc.) and distinct rationalities (rights-based vs. 
economic-calculations-based). People displaced by natural disasters are included into a 
protection framework. It is hoped that by improving the resilience of affected 
communities in a development framework such forced migration can be minimised. The 
V. FRIEDMANN  COJOURN 1:1 (2016) 
22 
 
remainder of migration is understood as voluntary mobility based on economic 
calculations, not as a rights issue prompting international responsibility, and is mobilised 
in the service of this latter framework. 
Disaggregating issues as complex as the impact of climate change on human 
mobility has many advantages. It brings the scale of problems to a manageable level, 
allowing the identification of concrete points of intervention. It gives actors more options: 
they can address different sub-sets in different frameworks so as to develop acceptable 
frames for global cooperation (Geiger & Pécoud, 2012a: 4). Furthermore, by breaking 
down a complex issue to specific aspects fitting the profile of already existing regimes or 
institutions, it facilitates their incorporation into global governance (Vlassopoulos, 2013). 
By easing cooperation, disaggregation has contributed greatly to protecting some of the 
most vulnerable. 
Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that the choice of “relevant” causal links, 
problem definitions and categorizations of objects of governance somehow reflect an 
objective reality. Such selective simplifications are always for someone and for some 
purpose (Cox, 1986). Furthermore, to attribute causal force to human actors is to attribute 
responsibility, even if such responsibility can be qualified by circumstances (e.g. justified 
lack of awareness of one’s power). To move from one understanding of the problem to 
another is to shift, erase or highlight such relations of responsibility. 
Many authors have already drawn attention to the depoliticizing effects of the way 
in which the climate-migration nexus has been taken up in global governance. Both sides 
of the dual structure described above are implicated in removing the question from the 
realm of political contestation by presenting it as a purely economic or moral issue to be 
decided by the relevant experts (Schmitt, 1995). The protection agenda handles climate 
migrants in terms of human rights violations, thus evoking the universal moral and legal 
responsibility of the international community. Migration management, on the other hand, 
promises a completely neutral solution in which everybody (the receiving state, the 
communities of origin and the migrants themselves) wins, and where there are no power 
asymmetries, divergent interests or contested problem-formulations (Kothari, 2014; 
Geiger & Pécoud, 2012a; Pécoud, 2013). From being understood as victims, migrants 
become perceived as the empowered, adaptive agents of circular migration, who use their 
entrepreneurial spirit to provide resources for the global South while being incorporated 
in the system of global neoliberal capitalism (Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015; Methmann & 
Oels, 2015; Felli, 2013; Felli, 2014). Such discourses contributed to removing or 
V. FRIEDMANN  COJOURN 1:1 (2016) 
23 
 
obscuring the responsibility of the developed countries for the effects of climate change, 
and to shifting efforts from the mitigation of climate change (including significant cuts 
by the biggest GHG emitters) to adaptation and resilience-building in the global South.  
In conclusion, one may complement these depoliticizing effects with a further 
element. Whereas the above-mentioned analyses tend to handle climate migration 
governmentality as a relatively unitary phenomenon with clearly discernible shifts in one 
particular direction, this article wishes to draw attention, instead, to the complexity of the 
institutional structure offered. Over and above the shift from victimhood to adaptive 
agency, from “migration threat” to “managed migration”, from mitigation and traditional 
adaptation policies towards neoliberal resilience, there also continues to develop a parallel 
system addressing those cases of forced migration that cannot be subsumed under the 
former framework. Migration is not simply depoliticised but is disaggregated and 
depoliticised. What is at issue here is the scale of analysis: the choice, between systems 
thinking at the level of national and community resilience on the one hand, and systems 
thinking at the global or planetary level on the other, is not a neutral one (Gottwald, 2014: 
533–5). 
Climate change is at the centre of what scientists have begun to call “the 
Anthropocene,” an era in which humanity becomes a geological force so that it is no 
longer possible to clearly distinguish the natural from the human (Crutzen, 2002). As 
critical voices have emphasised, the term “the Anthropocene” is deceptive as it suggests 
that it is mankind, or human nature, that is responsible for the way we change our planet 
(Malm & Hornborg, 2014). Most of mankind, however, is the victim rather than the agent 
of the so-called Anthropocene. Climate change is the outcome of a geographically uneven 
historical social development beginning with the Industrial Revolution, thus it is 
sociogenic rather than anthropogenic. A crucial part of these social relations is the system 
of sovereign states and the limits it places on human mobility. State control over migration 
is a major reason why much of the world population has not benefited from the economic 
development the externalities of which now threaten foremost precisely communities in 
the global South.  
Fixing our gaze at the planetary level, the causal relationship between the 
prosperity of developed countries, climate change, and the growing environmental 
challenges of developing countries appears with clarity, and may even amount to “a 
persecution that we are inflicting on the most vulnerable” (Gemenne, 2015: 71). When 
we move down from this systemic level in order to identify concrete causal processes that 
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can be managed we lose sight of an overall picture of power and responsibility. The 
special responsibility of the developed countries for externalising their costs of 
development and engaging in activities that impact the life of many outside their 
sovereignty (Nawrotzki, 2014; Gibney, 2014: 52) is lost between a universal moral 
responsibility for human rights violations and the technical cost-benefit optimization of 
migration management. In the process of disaggregating – for policy purposes – this 
sociogenic, planetary problem stemming from our economic model and principles of 
global political order, the transformative potential inherent in confronting this problem is 
tamed as the very same systemic conditions are reified as being the natural framework 
within which problems must be addressed. 
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